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Off-the-Record Meeting on Cuba

October 16, 1962

11:50 A.M.—12:57 P.M.

SPEAKERS (in order of appearance)

CAROLINE: Caroline Kennedy, President Kennedy's daughter.
JFK: John F. Kennedy, President
LUNDAHL: Arthur C. Lundahl, Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
GRAYBEAL: Sidney Graybeal, Chief, Guided Missile Division, Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA
MCNAMARA: Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
TAYLOR: Maxwell Taylor, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
RUSK: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
BUNDY: McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
DILLON: Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
JOHNSON: Lyndon Baines Johnson, Vice President
RFK: Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
SPEAKER?: Speaker unknown or identity uncertain

A NOTE ON THE TRANSCRIPT

Punctuation, with some exceptions, remains as in the original. The following codes are used as follows:

(remarks)

Remarks in parentheses reflect comments of the original tape transcriber.

[remarks]

Remarks in brackets reflect comments by editors of this volume.

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Dashes reflect that a speaker has paused or been interrupted, or that a short comment of the transcriber has been eliminated for continuity.

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CAROLINE: The text
JFK: in this portion has
CAROLINE: been closed
JFK: in accordance with
CAROLINE: the donor's deed
JFK: of gift.
(Laughter)
SPEAKER?: (Words unintelligible)
JFK: Okay.
LUNDAHL: This is a result of the photography taken Sunday, sir.
JFK: Yeah.

LUNDAHL: There's a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two new military encampments on the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in west central Cuba.

JFK: Where would that be?

LUNDAHL: Uh, west central, sir. That—

...
JFK: How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?

LUNDAHL: The length, sir.

JFK: The what? The length?

LUNDAHL: The length of it. Yes.

...
JFK: Is this ready to be fired?

GRAYBEAL: No, sir.

JFK: How long have we got—We can't tell, I take it—

GRAYBEAL: No, sir.

JFK: —how long before it can be fired?

GRAYBEAL: That depends on how ready the (GSC?) (how or hours?)

JFK: But, what does it have to be fired from?

GRAYBEAL: It would have to be fired from a stable hard surface. This could be packed dirt; it could be concrete or, or asphalt. The surface has to be hard, then you put a flame deflect—, a deflector plate on there to direct the missile.

MCNAMARA: Would you care to comment on the position of nuclear warheads—this is in relation to the question from the president—explain when these can be fired?

GRAYBEAL?: Sir, we've looked very hard. We can find nothing that would spell nuclear warhead in term of any isolated area or unique security in this particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile from some of the other short-range missiles there would take about, uh, a couple of hours to do this.

MCNAMARA: This is not defended, I believe, at the moment?

LUNDAHL: Not yet, sir.

MCNAMARA: This is important as it relates to whether these, today, are ready to fire, Mr. President. It seems almost impossible to me that they would be ready to fire with nuclear warheads on the site without even a fence

around it. It may not take long to k—, to place them there, to erect a fence, but at least at the moment there is some reason to believe the warheads aren't present and hence they are not ready to fire.

GRAYBEAL: Yes, sir, we do not believe they are ready to fire—

TAYLOR?: However, there is no feeling that they can't fire from this kind of field position very quickly, isn't that true? It's not a question of waiting for extensive concrete, uh, pads and that sort of thing?

GRAYBEAL?: The unknown factor here, sir, is the degree to which the equipment has been checked out after it's been shipped from the Soviet Union here. It's the readiness of the equipment. If the equipment is checked out, the site has to be accurately surveyed, the position as is known. Once this is known, then you're talking a matter of hours.

...
MCNAMARA: There's no question about that. The question is one of readiness of the. to fire and—and this is highly critical in forming our plans—that the time between today and the time when the readiness to fire capability develops is a very important thing. To estimate that we need to know where these warheads are, and we have not yet found any probable storage of warheads and hence it seems extremely unlikely that they are now ready to fire or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours or even a day or two.

...
JFK: Secretary Rusk?

RUSK: Yes, (Well?), Mr. President, this is a, of course, a (widely?) serious

development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could. uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own (in the same?) (words unintelligible) with a Soviet base, thus making it (essential to or essentially?) Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't (word unintelligible) with it anyhow, so—now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we (can?) sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so (eminently or heavily?) involved with forty-two allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Uhm, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we (make or think?), that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved [in] doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply

doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days—from the military point of view, if we have the whole time, uh, then I would think, that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Uhm, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS [Organization of American States] procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated (and actually?) what acts should (we take or be taken?) in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance(s?) to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro (apart?) privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are

preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the [*New York Times*] story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military, um, uh, actions that we could, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selective units (no more than?) 150,000. Unless we feel that it's better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we announce, at the time that we announce this development—and I think we do have to announce this development some time this week—uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matters of this sort. We, we reinforce our forces in Guantánamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States—whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also, to take care of any, uh, MiGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position.

[15 lines excised]

I think also that we need a few days, um, to alert our other allies, for consultation with NATO. I'll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who's involved at this point, that, uh, if they're interested in peace, they've got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade. I think it would be important to use the, uh, consider, uh, calling in General [Dwight] Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is made as to the situation and the (forcible?) action which you might determine upon.

But I think that, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies *and* Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh—Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be done but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, put the (word unintelligible) down before it gets too hard. Those are my, my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, uh, what I and what my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.

McNAMARA: Mr. President, there are a number of

unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them. But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an airstrike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any airstrike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the airstrike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any airstrike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive airstrike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say

two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underline our, our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an airstrike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an airstrike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but, we are prepared for that quickly. The airstrike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place within, just before the airstrike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the airstrike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. [Words excised] —after the start of the airstrike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. (Fine?) Associated with this airstrike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the airstrike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor,

uh, outline his choice.

SPEAKER?: Almost too (words unintelligible) to Cuba.

SPEAKER?: Yes.

TAYLOR: Uh, we're impressed. Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean *ideally* that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we'd like to do is to look at this new photography, I think—and take any additional—and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible and then take 'em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you've been talking about. It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I'm having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o'clock, to talk this out with 'em and get their best judgment.

I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a

naval blockade. So I suppose that all—and also a reinforcement of Guantánamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, in point of time, I'm, I'm thinking in terms of three phases.

One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, an airstrike against, as the secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, nuclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantánamo and evacuate the dependents. I'd then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba.

Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we're mobilizing, uh, with the airstrike as to whether we invade or not. I think that's the hardest question militarily in the whole business—one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.

RUSK: There are st—, one or two things, Mr. President, uh, [Andrei] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday. Uh, it may be of some interest to know what he says about this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Uh, but that—I just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this (topic?). I might say incidentally, sir, that you delay anything else you have to do at this point.

Secondly, I don't believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before *it* goes off because if they shoot *those* missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union

has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot 'em off before they get knocked out by aircraft—So, I'm not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise (critical?) element, Bob.

MCNAMARA: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don't know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don't know what kinds of control they have over the warheads.

RUSK: Yes, (words unintelligible).

MCNAMARA: If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would—frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue with the excessive (time?)—this is why I suggest that if we're talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it *only* on the assumption that we can carry it off before these become operational.

JFK: What is the, uh, advant—Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a—must be that they're not satisfied with their ICBMs. What'd be the reason that they would, uh—

TAYLOR: What it'd give 'em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short-range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [defective?] ICBM system, for example. There's one reason.

JFK: Of course, I don't see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine.

TAYLOR: Well, I think that thing is all over—

JFK: I mean if we let 'em blockade the thing, they come in by submarine.

MCNAMARA: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you'll take them out the moment they come in. You'll take them out and you'll carry on open surveillance and you'll have a policy to take them out if they come in. [Words excised]

[3 lines excised]

BUNDY: Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an airstrike must go to the whole air complex?

MCNAMARA: Well, we are, Mac—because we are fearful of these MiG 21s. We don't know where they are. We don't know what they're capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential.

[8 lines excised]

RUSK: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, uhm, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um—

JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

TAYLOR?: We have Jupiter missiles—

BUNDY?: Yeah. We have how many?

MCNAMARA: About fifteen, I believe it is.

BUNDY²: I think that's right. I think that's right.

SPEAKER²: (Words unintelligible)

RUSK: But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily—

MCNAMARA: Aircraft.

RUSK: —be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth.

SPEAKER²: Route 'em through Turkey.

RUSK: U'm, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological (plank²). I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Uhm, for the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've (hardly²) talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words, like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets' pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.

BUNDY: It's important, I think, to recognize that they did make this decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early

summer, and this has been happening since August. The TASS statement of September 12, which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit statement, "The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The president of the United States and the American military, the military of any country know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten (the) United States?"

Now there, it's very hard to reconcile *that* with what has happened. The rest, as the secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba and Italy, Turkey, and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev is, honestly believes, or, or at least affects to believe that we have nuclear weapons in, in Japan, that combination, (word unintelligible)—

...

JFK: Doug, do you have any—

DILLON: No. The only thing I'd, would say is that, uh, this alternative course of, of warning, getting, uh, public opinion, uh, OAS action and telling people in NATO and everything like that, would appear to me to have the danger of, uh, getting us wide out in the open and forcing the Russians to, uh, Soviets to take a, a position that if anything was done, uh, they would, uh, have to retaliate. Whereas, uh, a, a quick action, uh, with a statement at the same time saying this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to, uh, back off and not do anything. Meanwhile, I think that the chance of getting through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a

- quick, uh, strike than, uh, building the whole thing up to a, a climax then going through—(It will be a lot of debate on it?)
- RUSK: That is, of course, a possibility, but uh—
- BUNDY: The difficulties—I, I share the Secretary of the Treasury's feeling a little bit—the difficulties of organizing the OAS and NATO; the amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that, uh, they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we; uh, the division in the alliance; the certainty that the Germans would feel that we *were* jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that pattern is not an appetizing one—
- RUSK: Yes, but you see—
- BUNDY: (words unintelligible)
- RUSK: —uh, uh, everything turns crucially on what *happens*.
- BUNDY: I agree, Mr. Secretary.
- RUSK: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they *do* back it up, then you've exposed all of your allies (words unintelligible), ourselves to all these great dangers without—
- BUNDY: You get all these noises again.
- RUSK: —without, uh, the slightest consultation or, or warning or preparation.
- JFK: But, of course, warning them, uh, it seems to me, is warning everybody. And I, I, obviously you can't sort of announce that in four days from now you're going to take them out. They may announce within three days they're going to fire them. Then what'll, what'll we do? Then we don't take 'em out. Of course, we then announce, well, if they do that, then we're going to attack with nuclear weapons.
- DILLON: Yes, sir, that's the question that nobody, I didn't understand, nobody had mentioned, is whether this s—, uh, "take-out," this mission, uh, was (word unintelligible) to deal with—
- SPEAKER?: I don't know.
- DILLON: —high explosives?
- SPEAKER?: High explosives, yes.
- JFK: How effective can the take-out be, do they think?
- TAYLOR?: It'll never be a 100 percent, Mr. President, we know. Uh, we hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike, but this is not just one thing, one strike, one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we di—, discover a target.
- ...
- JFK: How long will, do we estimate this will remain secure, this, uh, information, uh, people have it?
- BUNDY: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr. President, I think we are in [an] unusually and fortunately good position. We set up a, uh, new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter. That, uh, limits this, uh, to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in intelligence terms to work on the data and the people who have—
- JFK: How many would that be, about?
- BUNDY: Oh, that will be a very *large* number, but that's not generally where leaks come from. Uh, the more (important?) limitation is that only officers with the policy responsibility

for advice directly to you'll receive this—

JFK: How many would get it over in the Defense Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?

TAYLOR: Well, I was going to mention that. We'd have to ask for relaxation of the ground rules, uh, that, that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can, uh, give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.

JFK: Would that be about fifty?

TAYLOR: By then—No, sir. I would say that, uh, within, at this stage *ten* more.

MCNAMARA: Well, Mr. President, I, I think, to be realistic, we should assume that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at least by political representatives of both parties within—I would, I'm just picking a figure—I'd say a week.

...

JFK: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?

JOHNSON: —I think that, uh, we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a buildup that in any way endangers (us) to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. I would think the secretary's evaluation of this being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I would think it would take a week to do it. Maybe a little before then.

I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out.

JFK: Well, uh, the, uh—

JOHNSON: Assuming these commanders felt that way—I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine, but I don't think, I don't rely on 'em much for any strength in anything like this. People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. Uh, I think we have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what they say, what they're—(I'm) not much for circularizing it over the Hill or our allies, even though I realize it's a breach of faith. It's the one not to confer with them. We're not going to get much help out of them.

...

JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which—What you're really talking about are two or three different, uh, (tense?) operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second, is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, uh, third, and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation—

[3 lines excised]

SPEAKER?: Uhm.

JFK: Just have to (words unintelligible) and do it. Probably ought to tell them, though, the night before.

RFK: Mr. President.

JFK: Yes.

RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you're dropping bombs all over Cuba

if you do the second, uh, air, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it—

SPEAKER?: Yeah.

RFK: —and, uh, and then, uh, you know, the heat, you're going to announce the reason that you're doing it is because, uh, they're sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we're going to do, we're going to do the same thing to Turkey, or we're going to do the same thing to Iran.

...

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile,

we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will—I don't think we got much time on these missiles. They may be—so it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take *them out*, and continue our other preparations if we decided to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to—because that's what we're going to do *anyway*. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general airstrike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We ought to be making *those* preparations.

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